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Abstract—We propose and analyze a business model for 5G
operators. Each operator is entitled to a share of a network
operated by an Infrastructure Provider (InP) and use network
slicing mechanisms to request network resources as needed for
service provision. The network operators become Network Slice
Tenants (NSTs). The InP performs the resource allocation based
on a vector of weights chosen strategically by each NST. The
weights distribute the NST’s share of resources between its
subscribers in each cell. We propose a strategy profile in which
the NST chooses weights equal to the product of its share by the
ratio between the total number of subscribers in the cell and the
total number of subscribers in the network. We characterize the
proposed solution in terms of subscription ratios and fractions
of subscribers, for different cell capacities and user sensitivities.
The proposed solution provides the exact values for the Nash
equilibrium if the cells are homogeneous in terms of normalized
capacity, which is a measure of the total amount of resources
available in the cell. Otherwise, if the cells are heterogeneous, it
provides an accurate approximation. We quantify the deviation
from the equilibrium and conclude that it is highly accurate.
Index Terms—Network economics, network slicing, competi-
tion, resource allocation, Network Slice Tenants.
I. INTRODUCTION
The current mobile network architecture utilizes a relatively
monolithic access and transport framework to accommodate a
variety of services such as mobile traffic for smart phones,
OTT content, feature phones, data cards, and embedded M2M
devices. It is anticipated that this architecture will not be
flexible and scalable enough to support the coming 5G net-
work, which demands very diverse use cases and sometimes
extreme requirements—in terms of performance, scalability
and availability. Furthermore, the introduction of new network
services should be made more efficiently [1].
In the above scenario, network slicing is gaining an increas-
ing importance as an effective way to introduce flexibility in
the management of network resources. A network slice is a
collection of network resources, selected in order to satisfy
the requirements (e.g. in terms of QoS) of the service(s) to be
provided by the slice. An enabling aspect of network slicing
is virtualization. Virtualization of network resources allows
operators to share the same physical resource in a flexible
and dynamic manner to exploit the available resources more
efficiently [2].
Within the above context, we envision a scenario where a
set of network operators use network slicing mechanisms to
request network resources as needed for service provision. The
InP is responsible for the network operation and maintenance,
while the network operators become Network Slice Tenants
(NSTs) 1. The NSTs are entitled to a share of the network
resources. This entitlement may result from diverse scenario,
e.g., the operators owned the networks and decided to pool
the networks and outsource their operation to and InP.
We propose a business model where the NSTs provide
service to end users. This service may be characterized by a
series of performance constraints (e.g., transmission rate and
delay) and each NST gets revenues from its subscribers. In
order to support the service, the NSTs request dynamically
access and core network resources from an InP. The InP works
as a supporting unit to the NSTs.
Our work analyzes how independent NSTs compete against
each other following the business model described above. We
show that the strategic interaction between the NSTs both
in the provision of the service and in the slicing of the
network can be modeled as a game, where the strategy is
a weighted distribution of the NST’s share of the resources
between the cells. A solution for the Nash equilibrium is
proposed in which the NST chooses weights equal to the
product of its share by the ratio between the total number
of subscribers in the cell and the total number of subscribers
in the network. We characterize the proposed solution for
different cell capacities and user sensitivities. The proposed
solution provides the exact values at the equilibrium if the cells
are homogeneous in terms of normalized capacity, which is a
measure of the available resources in the cell normalized to
the service price, the number of users and the no-subscription
option valuation. Otherwise, if the cells are heterogeneous, it
provides an accurate approximation of the equilibrium. We
quantify the deviation from the equilibrium and conclude that
it is highly accurate.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, the model
for the NSTs, the users, and the InP is described. In Section III,
a strategic game is formulated for the interaction between the
NSTs, a solution for the Nash equilibrium is proposed and
its exactness is discussed. In Section IV, we characterize the
1We can also envision other emergent players becoming NSTs, e.g., OTT
service providers. Even Vertical Industry players may take this role when
needing connectivity services for their sensors or their smart vehicles [3], [4].
solution and quantify the exactness of the proposed solution.
And finally, Section V draws the conclusions.
A. Related work
This work draws on previous works on the provision of ser-
vices based on different kind of resources, e.g., spectrum [5],
sensing measures [6], general data [7].
As far as the resource allocation is concerned, we are
indebted to the seminal proposal made by I. Fisher. The
Fisher market is one of the most fundamental models within
mathematical economics [8]. The basic setting is that of a
set of buyers aiming to purchase multiple goods in a way
that maximizes their utility subject to budget constraints. The
outcome where supply equals demand is known as market
equilibrium, and has the property that the buyers spend their
entire budgets, all the goods are sold, and the bundle purchased
by each buyer maximizes his utility (given his budget and
the equilibrium prices of the goods). A market equilibrium
is guaranteed to exist under mild conditions. This model has
been borrowed by recent proposals on resource allocation
mechanisms. In [9], the allocation of computational resources
are analyzed, where the budget may have a monetary interpre-
tation. In [10], radio network resources are allocated between
network slices, and the budget derives from an initial lease of
resources from the NSTs to a common network pool operated
by the InP. The above allocation model and mechanism results
in a non-efficient allocation when the users act in a strategic
manner [9].
Our work focuses on the allocation of 5G network resources
that are procured by the tenants through network slicing. We
borrow the ideas from the Fisher market model, as in [10].
We are also indebted to the work in [10] and [11] in that
the allocation is of a hierarchical nature, where the NSTs
are involved in the allocation—as opposed to a centralized
scheme, where the InP decides and executes the complete
allocation to all users. However, our work differs importantly
from these two previous works in that we model the NSTs and
the users as different agents with their particular incentives,
which are the profits and the user utility, respectively. In [10]
and [11], each NST operates as a proxy of its subscribers;
this may fail to properly model the NST’s incentives and the
corresponding business model. This difference has also an
important implication in the user behavior modeling: while in
our work the number of subscribers for each NST depends
on the NSTs allocation decision, in [10] and [11], it is
independent from it, since the number of subscribers is fixed
a priori as a parameter.
II. MODEL
In this section, we propose a model amenable for the
analysis of the service provision by NSTs, within a network
slicing framework.
A. System model
A network consists of a set of resources B managed by an
InP and leased by a set S of NSTs. We focus on mobile service
operators and, specifically, on the radio access network, so that
each element of B may represent the radio resources of a cell
in the network.
The resources leased by the NSTs are used to deliver service
to a set U of users. We define the following subsets of users:
U (j), the users in cell j; Ui, the subscribers of NST i; and
U
(j)
i = U
(j) ∩ Ui, the subscribers of NST i in cell j.
NST i is entitled to a share si of the total amount of
resources available in the network, such that
∑
i∈S si = 1.
The NST allocates the resource for providing service to
its subscribers in the following way. NST i distributes its
share among its subscribers, assigning a weight ω
(j)
i to U
(j)
i ,
such that ω
(j)
i > 0 and
∑
j∈B ω
(j)
i = si ≤ 1. The weight
assignment decision is notified to the InP, who proceeds to
perform the actual resource allocation in each individual cell.
The InP allocates an amount of resources to the set U
(j)
i given
by
R
(j)
i =
ω
(j)
i∑
t∈S ω
(j)
t
c(j) (1)
where c(j) is the capacity of cell j, which represents the total
amount of resources available in the cell.
Furthermore, in this allocation scheme, NST i chooses
weight ω
(j)
i for the set of its subscribers in cell j and the
InP performs the actual resource allocation in each individual
cell according to (1). Proceeding in such indirect way, the
capacity constraint in each cell is automatically enforced, i.e.,∑
i∈S R
(j)
i = c
(j), ∀j ∈ B.
B. Economic model
Each NST provides service to users based on the resource
allocation agreed with the InP, according to the description
made above. Pricing for the service provision consists of a
flat-rate price pi. We assume that variable costs incurred by
the NSTs are zero, so that only fixed costs are incurred.
Furthermore, since the fixed costs are not relevant to the
weight decision made by the NSTs, they are not included in
the analysis.
We use a discrete-choice model for the modeling of the
users’ choices, which is frequently used in econometrics [12].
Specifically, given a discrete set of options, the utility of a
user u ∈ U (j) making the choice i is assumed to be equal to
v
(j)
i + κu,i: the term v
(j)
i encompasses the objective aspects
of option i and is the same for all users in U
(j)
i , while κu,i
is an unobserved user-specific value that is modeled on the
global level as a random variable. From the distribution of
these i.i.d. variables, one can compute the probability that a
user selects option i, and when the user population size is
sufficiently large, this corresponds to the proportion of users
making that choice. In our model, the user choice is the choice
of one of the NSTs in S.
To model the objective part of the users’ utility, each sub-
scriber pays the price pi to NST i, and receives service in cell j
supported by an amount of resources r
(j)
i . Following [13], we
propose
v
(j)
i = µ log
(
r
(j)
i /pi
)
. (2)
Firstly, the higher the amount of resources supporting the
service, the higher the utility the user derives from it. More
specifically, utility depends logarithmically on the amount of
resources, as there is increasing evidence that user experience
and satisfaction in telecommunication scenarios follow loga-
rithmic laws [14]. Secondly, the dependence on the price is
through a negative logarithm, instead; or in other words, the
ratio r
(j)
i /pi is proposed to be the relevant magnitude for the
utility. And thirdly, µ > 0 is a sensitivity parameter.
To model the unobserved user-specific part of the utility,
following the literature on discrete-choice models, we assume
that each user-specific random variable κu,i follows a Gumbel
distribution of mean 0 and parameter ν. The choice of the
Gumbel distribution allows us to obtain a logistic function, as
shown below.
With the users’ utility modeled as stated above, it can be
shown [15] that the number of users n
(j)
i that subscribe to
NST i over the total number of users in cell j, n(j), is
n
(j)
i
n(j)
=
(r
(j)
i /pi)
α∑
t∈S(r
(j)
t /pt)
α + (r
(j)
0 /p0)
α
, i ∈ S, j ∈ B,
(3)
where α = µ/ν is the user sensitivity parameter (it models
the sensitivity to the resources-to-price ratio), and r
(j)
0 /p0 is
related to the utility of not subscribing, v
(j)
0 , through (2):
r
(j)
0 /p0 = e
v
(j)
0 /µ. Note that the no-subscription option does
not correspond to any network slice in S and therefore no
weights are assigned to it. The case in which all users in
cell j subscribe (i.e., a user in that cell will always be better
off by subscribing than by not doing it) is captured by letting
v
(j)
0 → −∞ or, equivalently, setting r
(j)
0 = 0. In practice,
this case corresponds to a more general situation in which the
utility of subscribing to some of the NSTs clearly outweighs
the no-subscription option, that is, r
(j)
i /pi ≫ r
(j)
0 /p0 for some
i ∈ S.
We assume that the users are price-takers, which is a
sensible assumption for a sufficiently high number of users
in each cell.
As argued in the next section, and for the sake of simplicity,
we assume that the service price is the same for every NST:
pi = p, ∀i ∈ S. (4)
Besides, without any loss of generality, we set p0 = 1 to
reduce the number of parameters. The number of subscribers
to NST i in cell j is then given by
n
(j)
i = n
(j) (r
(j)
i )
α∑
t∈S(r
(j)
t )
α + (p r
(j)
0 )
α
, i ∈ S, j ∈ B.
(5)
We assume that the resources allocated by the InP to NST i
at a cell are equally shared among the users in U
(j)
i , that is,
on average, the amount of resources supporting the service to
a user is
r
(j)
i =
R
(j)
i
n
(j)
i
, i ∈ S, j ∈ B. (6)
Taking into account (1), the amount of resources assigned
to a user is
r
(j)
i =
ω
(j)
i∑
t∈S ω
(j)
t
c(j)
n
(j)
i
, i ∈ S, j ∈ B (7)
and substituting (7) into (5), we come to
∑
t∈S
(
ω
(j)
t
n
(j)
t
)α
+
(
pr
(j)
0
c(j)
∑
t∈S ω
(j)
t
)α
n(j)
=
(ω
(j)
i )
α
(n
(j)
i )
α+1
,
i ∈ S; j ∈ B. (8)
Let σ(j) denote the subscription ratio in cell j, that is, the
fraction of users in cell j that subscribe to one NST:
σ(j) =
1
n(j)
∑
i∈S
n
(j)
i , j ∈ B; (9)
and let
γ(j) =
c(j)
n(j)p r
(j)
0
, j ∈ B. (10)
We refer to γ(j) as the normalized capacity of cell j, and
it represents the capacity per monetary unit and per user
(assuming that the cell capacity is shared equally between
all of them) normalized by the virtual capacity of the no-
subscription option, r
(j)
0 .
The next proposition states that the subscription ratio σ(j)
depends on the normalized capacity γ(j), on the user sensitiv-
ity α through
β =
α
α+ 1
< 1, (11)
and on the weights in cell j of all the NSTs (i.e., ω
(j)
i , i ∈ S).
Proposition 1:
1) If r
(j)
0 > 0, then the value of σ
(j) is the unique solution
in (0, 1) of the equation
σ(j) −
(
γ(j)
)β ∑t∈S (ω(j)t )β(∑
t∈S ω
(j)
t
)β (1− σ(j))1−β = 0.
(12)
2) If r
(j)
0 = 0, then σ
(j) = 1.
The proof of this proposition can be found in the Appendix.
Due to lack of space the rest of our results are stated without
proof.
In the general case (i.e., when r
(j)
0 > 0), the previous
proposition does not provide a closed-form expression for the
subscription ratio σ(j), but a non-linear equation from which
it can be obtained numerically. The following propositions
provide some useful insight by establishing some properties
of σ(j) as a function of the normalized capacity and the
user sensitivity. Some of these results confirm what intuition
suggests. For example, for given fixed values of the weights, it
seems intuitive that the subscription ratio σ(j) is an increasing
function of the normalized capacity γ(j), and that a subscrip-
tion ratio as close as desired to 1 can be obtained by increasing
γ(j) sufficiently. The impact of the networks share is examined
later in Proposition 5.
Proposition 2: For given fixed values of ω
(j)
i , i ∈ S, σ
(j)
is an increasing function of γ(j) and
lim
γ(j)→0
σ(j) = 0 (13)
lim
γ(j)→∞
σ(j) = 1. (14)
Proposition 3:
lim
β→0
σ(j) =
|S|
1 + |S|
(15)
lim
β→1
σ(j) = min
(
1, γ(j)
)
. (16)
Let ρ
(j)
i denote the fraction of subscribing users in cell j
that subscribe to NST i:
ρ
(j)
i =
n
(j)
i∑
t∈S n
(j)
t
=
n
(j)
i
σ(j)n(j)
. (17)
This fraction can be expressed as a function of the weights at
that cell as given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: For each cell j ∈ B and each NST i ∈ S
ρ
(j)
i =
(ω
(j)
i )
β∑
t∈S(ω
(j)
t )
β
. (18)
III. GAME MODEL AND ANALYSIS
The revenue of NST i is equal to the total amount charged
to its subscribers, that is,
Πi = p
∑
j∈B
n
(j)
i , i ∈ S. (19)
Using (17) we can express the revenue as follows:
Πi = p
∑
j∈B
n(j)σ(j)ρ
(j)
i , i ∈ S, (20)
which depends not only on the weights ω
(j)
i set by NST i,
but also on the weights set by the other NSTs. Each NST is
assumed to operate in order to maximize its revenues.
We assume that the competition is not in terms of prices.
This may reflect a situation where a regulatory authority has
fixed the price. Or either, it may correspond to a situation
where the time frame of the weight setting—hours or days—is
much shorter than the time frame of the price setting—weeks
or months. Instead, we analyze the competition between the
NSTs in terms of quality of service, that is, on how each NST
sets weight ω
(j)
i in cell j in order to attract the users. The
vector of weights set by NST i, with one component ω
(j)
i for
each j ∈ B, is denoted by wi ∈ (0, 1)
|B|.
To decide on its strategy NST i has to solve the following
revenue maximization problem:
max
wi
Πi(wi,w−s)
subject to
∑
j∈B
ω
(j)
i ≤ si
wi ∈ (0, 1)
|B|,
(21)
where −i refers to all NSTs other than NST i and, hence,
w−i ∈ (0, 1)
(|S|−1)|B|.
As shown above, there is a strategic dependence of the
revenue of NST i on the weights set by the competing
NSTs. This fact allows us to model the combined revenue
maximization problems as a strategic game. We will use
a simultaneous one-shot game model for the analysis. The
solution is the Nash equilibrium. In the Nash equilibrium, the
weights that each NST chooses in each cell are such that it gets
no revenue improvement from changing the weights assuming
that the competitor NSTs do not deviate from the equilibrium
weights. Let Bi(w−i) be the best response function for NST i,
which assigns the solution of (21) to each w−i. If w
∗
i i∈S is a
Nash equilibrium, then w∗i ∈ Bi(w
∗
−i) for all i ∈ S. Now, to
find the Nash equilibrium to our problem we try to solve the
equation wi = Bi(w−i) for a generic i ∈ S, so that it holds
for all NSTs simultaneously.
We propose the following form for the solution of our
Nash equilibrium problem, which we refer to as the proposed
solution:
ω
(j)
i =
σ(j)n(j)∑
k∈B σ
(k)n(k)
si, i ∈ S, j ∈ B. (22)
In this solution, each NST chooses, for each cell, a weight
equal to the product of its share by the ratio between the
total number of subscribers in the cell and the total number of
subscribers in the network. It should be noted that: (i) Eq. (22)
does not provide by itself a solution for the weights in the
equilibrium, since in this expression the weights depend on the
subscription ratios, which in turn depend on the weights (see
Proposition 1); (ii) the solution that can be derived from (22) is
exact (i.e., it is exactly equal to the Nash equilibrium) when the
normalized capacities of the cells satisfy certain requirements
(to be specified below), and it is a very accurate approximation
otherwise.
Next, we address these two issues. First we show how the
form of the solution given in (22) can be used to obtain the
actual solution and then study the properties of the solution.
Then we present the condition under which the proposed
solution is exact, and provide the mathematical arguments
that lead to this result. Finally, in Section IV an extensive
set of numerical experiments is used to show that, when the
proposed solution is not exact, it provides a highly accurate
approximation.
Substituting (22) into (12) we obtain
σ(j) −
(
γ(j)
)β∑
t∈S
sβt
(
1− σ(j)
)1−β
= 0, (23)
from where the value of σ(j) can be obtained numerically. We
observe that σ(j) solely depends on the normalized capacity
of the cell and on the share of all NSTs. Similarly, substitut-
ing (22) into (18) yields
ρ
(j)
i = ρi, (24)
where
ρi =
sβi∑
t∈S s
β
t
, i ∈ S. (25)
This tells us that, in each cell, the subscribers to the service
are split proportionally between the NSTs with the coefficients
sβi . We observe that ρ
(j)
i = ρi solely depends on the shares of
the NSTs and on β, and, consequently, is the same across all
cells.
As a complementary result to that of Proposition 2, the
following proposition establishes that in the equilibrium the
subscription ratio in all cells is maximum if all NSTs have
the same share.
Proposition 5: For given fixed values of the normalized
capacities γ(j), j ∈ B, the subscription ratio in each cell is
maximum when all NSTs are allocated the same share
si =
1
|S|
, i ∈ S (26)
and is minimum when a single NSTs is allocated all resources
si = 1, i ∈ S and st = 0, t ∈ S \ {i}. (27)
In other words, if
σ(j)max = max
{
σ(j) : si ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ S;
∑
i∈S
st = 1
}
(28)
σ
(j)
min = min
{
σ(j) : si ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ S;
∑
i∈S
st = 1
}
(29)
σ
(j)
max and σ
(j)
min can be obtained as the solutions to
σ(j)max − |S|
1−β
(
γ(j)
)β (
1− σ(j)max
)1−β
= 0 (30)
σ
(j)
min −
(
γ(j)
)β (
1− σ
(j)
min
)1−β
= 0. (31)
When all cells have the same normalized capacity, from (23)
we see that the subscription ratio is the same for all cells.
Furthermore, when r
(j)
0 = 0 we have σ
(j) = 1 (Proposition 1).
Thus, if r
(j)
0 = 0, j ∈ B, the subscription ratio is also the same
for all cells. In practice, the latter case captures those scenarios
in which the normalized capacity of all cells is sufficiently
high, so that all (or nearly all) users subscribe to an NST.
These observations are summarized in the next proposition,
which also draws additional conclusions.
Proposition 6: If one of the two following conditions is
satisfied:
• r
(j)
0 = 0, j ∈ B
• γ(j) = γ, j ∈ B
then:
1) The subscription ratio is the same in all cells:
σ(j) = σ, j ∈ B. (32)
2) The weights of the proposed solution become
ω
(j)
i =
n(j)
n
si, i ∈ S, j ∈ B. (33)
We would like to note that (33), which shows that the
equilibrium strategy for an NST is to distribute its share
proportionally to the number of users in each cell, is not the
result of a centralized decision made by the InP, but the result
of a game where each NST acts selfishly.
Under the condition of Proposition 6 the solution to the
Nash equilibrium problem given by (33) is exact and all results
derived from the proposed solution hold exactly. If none of the
conditions of Proposition 6 is met, then the proposed solution
and the rest of the results are approximate only, although with
high accuracy as will be shown in Section IV.
In the remainder of this section we discuss the arguments
that support the exactness, and also the uniqueness, of the
proposed solution when the required conditions are met.
We derive the solution to the revenue maximization prob-
lem of NST i, which will yield the best response function
Bi(w−i). The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KKT) for
NST i are as follows:
∇Πi(wi) = µi∇

∑
j∈B
ω
(j)
i − si

 (34)
µi ≥ 0, (35)∑
j∈B
ω
(j)
i − si ≤ 0, (36)
µi

∑
j∈B
ω
(j)
i − si

 = 0. (37)
The next proposition gives expressions for the first and
second derivatives of Πi with respect to the weights of NST i
Proposition 7: For j, k ∈ B, j 6= k, we have
∂Πi
∂ω
(j)
i
=
pβn(j)σ(j)ρ
(j)
i
ω
(j)
i (1− βσ
(j))
×
(
(1 − β)(1 − ρ
(j)
i )σ
(j) + (1 − x
(j)
i )(1 − σ
(j))
)
, (38)
∂2Πi
∂ω
(j)
i ∂ω
(k)
i
= 0 (39)
and (40) at the top of the next page, where
x
(j)
i =
ω
(j)
i∑
t∈S ω
(j)
t
. (41)
From (34) it follows that
∂Πi
∂ω
(j)
i
= µi, j ∈ B. (42)
Now, from (38) it is immediate that ∂Πi/∂ω
(j)
i > 0, which
combined with (37) shows that the constraint of (36) must be
active for all optimal points:∑
j∈B
ω
(j)
i = si. (43)
The next proposition states that when the subscription ratio
is the same across all cells, the proposed solution, which in
∂2Πi
∂
(
ω
(j)
i
)2 = pβn(j)σ(j)ρ
(j)
i(
ω
(j)
i
)2
(
1− σ(j)
1− βσ(j)
((
ρ
(j)
i − x
(j)
i
)2 β
1− βσ(j)
(
1− σ(j)
1− βσ(j)
− σ(j)
)
+
(
x
(j)
i
)2
+ β
(
1− ρ
(j)
i
)(
3ρ
(j)
i − 2x
(j)
i
)
− ρ
(j)
i
)
−
(
1− ρ
(j)
i
)(
1− β + 2βρ
(j)
i
))
(40)
that case takes the form given in (33), satisfies the necessary
KKT conditions.
Proposition 8: Under the condition of Proposition 6, the
weights of (33) and the multiplier
µi =
pβnσρi
si(1− βσ)
((1− β)(1 − ρi)σ + (1− si)(1− σ)) ,
(44)
satisfy the conditions (34)–(37).
From the above result, we can only conclude that the
proposed solution meets the necessary conditions to be a
maximum point. However, from (39) and (40) it can be
seen that when the subscription ratios are high enough (i.e.,
1 − σ(j), j ∈ B are small enough), the function Πi is
strictly concave with respect to wi, and thus the maximization
problem of (21) is convex. In this case, the KKT conditions are
also sufficient, and if there is a maximum point, it is unique.
We recall that the subscription ratio in a cell is high (i.e.,
close to 1) in the following cases:
• The normalized capacity of the cell is sufficiently high, so
that nearly all users subscribe to an NST (Propositions 1
and 2).
• The user sensitivity is low and the number of NSTs is
high (Proposition 3).
• The user sensitivity is high and the normalized capacity
is close to 1 or higher (Proposition 3).
When none of the conditions above is satisfied we are
not able to provide mathematical guarantees on the solution.
To validate the properties of the proposed solution under
more general conditions, we have conducted an extensive set
of numerical experiments under a wide range of conditions,
as reported in the next section. In all our experiments the
numerical solution was equal to the proposed solution, when
the condition of Proposition 6 was satisfied, and very close to
the proposed solution otherwise.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Let us refer by the homogeneous cells case the one in which
the conditions of Proposition 6 are satisfied (and hence the
subscription ratio is the same across all cells), and the hetero-
geneous cells case the general one. As stated in Section III,
if cells are homogeneous the proposed solution is an exact
solution, while otherwise it is an approximation only. In this
section we discuss the properties of the proposed solution
when cells are homogeneous and quantify its deviation from
the equilibrium when cells are heterogeneous.
All results in this section have been obtained by two
different methods. In the first one, the proposed solution (22)
Figure 1. Subscription ratio at the equilibrium as a function of the number
of NSTs for different values of α.
is applied to (23) and (24) to obtain the penetration ratios and
the fractions of subscribers at the equilibrium. In the second
method, the game is solved by means of asynchronous best-
response dynamics (ABRD). In our ABRD implementation,
starting from w
(r)
i = si/|S|, the weights are recalculated in
repeated steps until they converge to fixed values. In each step,
NSTs are ordered randomly and each of them calculates se-
quentially its best response (21). Best responses are calculated
numerically by means of a heuristic optimization algorithm
based on the cuckoo search algorithm [16]. The ABRD results
have confirmed the results obtained with the proposed solution
with homogeneous cells, and they have been used to evaluate
the accuracy of the approximation of the proposed solution
with heterogeneous cells.
A. Homogeneous cells
When conditions of Proposition 6 are satisfied, there is a
unique value of γ, and
• the subscription ratio is the same in all cells and can be
obtained from (23), making σ(r) = σ, and depends on γ,
on the shares and on α,
• and the exact fractions of subscribers are given by (25),
and depend on the shares and on α, but not on γ.
We first discuss the results for a scenario where all NSTs
have the same share (si = 1/|S|, i ∈ S). In this case, all
NSTs’ fractions of subscribers are 1/|S|, and the subscription
ratio is σ = σ
(j)
max given by (28).
In Figs. 1 and 2, the subscription ratio is represented as a
function of the number of NSTs, for γ = 1 and different values
of α (Fig. 1) and for α = 3 and different values of γ (Fig. 2).
In all cases, as the number of NSTs increases, the subscription
Figure 2. Subscription ratio at the equilibrium as a function of the number
of NSTs for different values of γ.
Figure 3. Maximum and minimum NST 1’s fraction of subscribers at the
equilibrium as a function of its share.
ratio increases, because |S|1−β increases with |S| (note that
1 − β > 0). This can be interpreted as that an increase in
the diversity of the service offering increases the subscription
ratio. Fig. 1 also shows that the subscription ratio increases
with the user sensitivity. Fig. 2 also shows, in accordance with
Proposition 2, that the greater the normalized capacity, the
greater the subscription ratio. For γ = 4, the subscription ratio
is close to 1, which means that if the normalized capacity is
high enough, the result is practically the same as for r
(r)
0 = 0
in all cells.
We now investigate how the asymmetry between the NSTs
in terms of share affects the results. For this, we illustrate a
scenario with 4 NSTs and α = 3, and show the results obtained
as a function of the share of one of them.
Fig. 3 shows NST 1’s fraction of subscribers at the equi-
librium as a function of its share in two different situations:
one in which the remaining share is shared equally between
the rest of NSTs (s2 = s3 = s4 = (1 − s1)/3) and
Figure 4. Subscription ratio at the equilibrium as a function of the term∑
t∈S s
β
t (share equality) for different values of γ.
another one in which one NST keeps all the remaining share
(s2 = 1−s1, s3 = s4 = 0). From (25), it is easy to show that
the second situation (the one in which the remaining share is
distributed as unequally as possible) is the most favorable for
NST 1; thus, the corresponding curve represents the maximum
fraction of subscribers that NST 1 can obtain. It can also be
checked that the first situation, in which the remaining share
is distributed equally, is the most unfavorable for NST 1, and
now the curve represents the minimum fraction of subscribers.
For any other distribution of the remaining share, the curve
would run between these two bounds.
Fig. 4 shows the subscription ratio as a function of the factor∑
t∈S s
β
t for several values of γ. This factor depends on the
degree of share equality and, together with γβ , determines the
result of (23). The figure shows that the higher the normalized
capacity and the share equality, the higher the subscription
ratio (Proposition 2). Also, according to Proposition 5, the
maximum values of σ correspond to si = 1/4, when all shares
are equal, and the minimum values are when a single NST
takes all the share (s1 = 1, s2 = s3 = s4 = 0).
B. Heterogeneous cells
When cells are heterogeneous the proposed solution does
not provide the exact equilibrium, but here we show that it
provides an accurate approximation. We denote by w˜
(r)
i , ρ˜i
and σ˜(r), the weights, fractions of subscribers and subscription
ratios at the equilibrium, respectively, computed from the
proposed solution, and keep the original names (w
(r)
i , ρ
(r)
i and
σ(r)) for the results obtained with ABRD. Note that, although
NST i’s fraction of subscribers obtained with the proposed
solution (ρ˜i) is the same for all cells, the one obtained with
ABRD (ρ
(r)
i ) is not. Besides, neither of the two subscription
ratios (σ(r) or σ˜(r)) is the same for all cells.
The plots in Figs. 5–7, correspond to a scenario with
4 NSTs, 5 cells and α = 3. NST 1’s share ranges from 0
to 1 and the remaining share is equally distributed between
the rest of NSTs. The numbers of users are (n(1), . . . , n(5)) =
(100, 200, 300, 400, 500), and the values of c(r) and r
(r)
0 have
been chosen so that (γ(1), . . . , γ(5)) = (0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4). The
Figure 5. NST 1’s weights at the equilibrium as a function of NST 1’s share,
compared with the proposed solution.
Figure 6. Subscription ratios in each cell at the equilibrium as a function of
NST 1’s share, compared with the proposed solution.
marks represent the values obtained with ABRD, while the
dashed lines represent the results of the proposed solution.
As seen in Figs. 5, NST 1’s weights obtained with ABRD
are very close to the proposed solution. In the cells with lower
γ(r) (cells 1, 2 and 3), they are slightly below the proposed
solution, while in the cells with higher γ(r) (cells 4 and 5)
they are slightly above. The subscription ratios in each cell
are represented in Fig. 6, where the values obtained with both
methods can hardly be distinguished from each other. Finally,
in Fig. 7 it can be seen that NST 1’s fractions of subscribers
are almost the same at the all cells, and that they are very
close to the result of the proposed solution, which in fact is
the same for all cells. Just like with the weights, the fractions
of subscribers obtained with ABRD are slightly lower than
those of the proposed solution in the cells with lower γ(r),
and slightly higher in the cells with higher γ(r).
These results suggest that the proposed solution provides
a very good approximation of the equilibrium in a general
case. In order to ensure the validity of this approach for a
wide range of the system parameters, we have computed the
deviation of the approximation for a diversity of types of
scenario, each one with different numbers of NSTs, numbers
of cells, values of α and ranges of γ(r). For each type of
scenario, we have evaluated 1000 scenarios both with the
Figure 7. NST 1’s fractions of subscribers in each cell at the equilibrium as
a function of NST 1’s share, compared with the proposed solution.
Figure 8. Histograms of the relative deviation (in percentage) of the
subscription ratios and fractions of subscribers with the proposed solution.
proposed solution and with ABRD. At each scenario, each
γ(r), r ∈ B, has been generated randomly with uniform
distribution in the range [γmin, γmax], and the shares have been
generated as an equiprobable random vector in the (|S| − 1)-
simplex {(s1 . . . s|S|) ∈ R
|S| |
∑
i∈S si = 1, si ≥ 0.1}.
Relative deviations of the subscription ratio, ǫ(ρ˜i), and of the
fraction of subscribers, ǫ(σ˜(r)), have been registered for all
cases. They are calculated as: ǫ(ρ˜i) = (ρ˜i − ρ
(r)
i )/ρ
(r)
i and
ǫ(σ˜(r)) = (σ˜(r) − σ(r))/σ(r).
One of these types of scenario, the one with 4 NSTs, 20
cells, α = 3 and γ(r) ∈ [0.25, 4] is illustrated in the histograms
of Fig. 8, where the relative deviations are expressed as
percentages. We see that the values of the relative deviation of
the fraction of subscribers are distributed almost symmetrically
around 0 and most values are below 1%. The relative deviation
of the subscription ratio is even smaller (most values are
below 0.1%) and that negative values are more frequent,
which suggests that the proposed solution tends to provide
Table I
PERCENTILES OF THE MODULE OF ǫ(ρ˜i) AND ǫ(σ˜
(r)) (IN PERCENTAGE)
|ǫ(ρ˜i)| × 100 |ǫ(σ˜
(r))| × 100
S R α [γmin, γmax] P90 P95 P90 P95
2 10
1
[0.25, 4]
1.5 2.0 0.112 0.193
3 2.7 3.8 0.112 0.240
5 2.6 4.0 0.093 0.208
7 2.1 4.0 0.051 0.151
2 20
1
[0.25, 4]
1.9 2.7 0.141 0.311
3 2.9 4.1 0.138 0.284
5 2.5 3.8 0.071 0.174
7 2.0 2.9 0.042 0.106
4 20
1
[0.25, 4]
0.6 0.8 0.026 0.050
3 1.5 2.2 0.061 0.131
5 1.2 1.8 0.033 0.064
7 1.3 2.1 0.036 0.071
2 10 3
[0.25, 0.5] 0.4 0.6 0.039 0.053
[0, 1] 0.7 1.2 0.064 0.082
[1, 2] 1.0 1.5 0.038 0.054
[2, 4] 0.6 0.9 0.007 0.011
2 20 3
[0.25, 0.5] 0.4 0.6 0.039 0.055
[0, 1] 1.1 1.6 0.082 0.104
[1, 2] 1.1 1.9 0.050 0.075
[2, 4] 0.6 0.9 0.007 0.012
4 20 3
[0.25, 0.5] 0.4 0.5 0.028 0.036
[0, 1] 0.7 0.9 0.038 0.051
[1, 2] 0.7 0.9 0.015 0.023
[2, 4] 0.3 0.3 0.005 0.005
an underestimate.
Table I shows the 90th and 95th percentiles of the module of
ǫ(ρ˜i) and ǫ(σ˜
(r)) for a wide range of scenarios. It is observed
that the deviations are slightly higher when γ(r) values are
smaller (in the range [0.25, 0.5]). But even in the worst case,
the 95th percentile of |ǫ(ρ˜i)| is below 4.2% and the 95th
percentile of |ǫ(σ˜(r))| is below 0.32%.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, a business model is proposed and analyzed
where the NSTs provide mobile communications services to
final users and provision themselves with resources from an
InP by means of network slicing mechanisms. Each NST
splits its share of the resources by choosing a weight for
each cell. Weights determine the proportion of resources that
each NST obtain in each cell, which in turn determines the
service that it can offer to users and therefore the number of
users subscribed. Each NST chooses its weights strategically
in order to maximize its number of subscribers.
We propose a solution for the Nash equilibrium in which
every NST chooses, for each cell, a weight equal to the product
of its share by the ratio between the total number of subscribers
in the cell and the total number of subscribers in the network.
This solution allows us to argue that network slicing provides
an attractive flexibility in the allocation of resources without
the need to enforce or control a policy through the InP.
For this solution, all the values at the equilibrium can
be easily computed through the expressions provided. The
proposed solution has the following properties:
• It provides the exact values at the equilibrium if the cells
are homogeneous in terms of normalized capacity. In this
case, the subscription ratio is the same in all cells.
• Otherwise, if the cells are heterogeneous, it provides an
accurate approximation of the equilibrium.
• In each cell, the subscription ratio increases with the nor-
malized capacity, and depends on the share distribution,
being maximum when all shares are equal.
• Each NST obtains a fraction of subscribers which is the
same in all cells. It depends only on its share, the user
sensitivity and the share distribution, and is minimum
when the shares of all the other NSTs are equal.
APPENDIX
Let f(x) = x− a(1− x)1−β , with a > 0 and β < 1.
Lemma 1: The function f(x) has one, and only one, root
in (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 1: When r
(j)
0 > 0, we can rewrite (8)
as (
ω
(j)
i
n
(j)
i
)α
=
n
(j)
i
n(j)
(∑
t∈S
(
ω
(j)
t
n
(j)
t
)α
+
(∑
t∈S ω
(j)
t
n(j)γ(j)
)α)
,
i ∈ S, j ∈ B. (45)
Now, adding (45) over all i ∈ S yields
∑
t∈S
(
ω
(j)
t
n
(j)
t
)α
= σ(j)
∑
t∈S
(
ω
(j)
t
n
(j)
t
)α
+σ(j)
(∑
t∈S ω
(j)
t
n(j)γ(j)
)α
,
j ∈ B, (46)
which can be rewritten as∑
t∈S
(
ω
(j)
t
n
(j)
t
)α
=
σ(j)
1− σ(j)
(∑
t∈S ω
(j)
t
n(j)γ(j)
)α
, j ∈ B. (47)
Substituting (47) into (45) and solving for n
(j)
i yields
n
(j)
i
n(j)
=
(
1− σ(j)
)1−β (
γ(j)
)β (ω(j)i )β(∑
t∈S ω
(j)
t
)β ,
i ∈ S, j ∈ B, (48)
where β = α/(α+ 1) < 1.
Finally, adding (48) over all i ∈ S, we obtain
σ(j)−
(
γ(j)
)β ∑t∈S (ω(j)t )β(∑
t∈S ω
(j)
t
)β (1− σ(j))1−β = 0, j ∈ B.
(49)
The application of Lemma 1 guarantees that (49) has a unique
solution in (0, 1).
In the case r
(j)
0 = 0, we can rewrite (8) as(
ω
(j)
i
n
(j)
i
)α
=
n
(j)
i
n(j)
∑
t∈S
(
ω
(j)
t
n
(j)
t
)α
, i ∈ S, j ∈ B. (50)
Adding this equality over all i ∈ S immediately leads to
σ(j) = 1.
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